Towards a Political Economy of Fascism
ALAN S. MILWARD
[In B. Hagtvet & R. Kuhnl (eds) Who Were The Fascists? Universitetsforlaget (1980)]
Until recently the National Socialist German Workers Party was the only fascist party about whose membership and support historians and political scientists had collected sufficient evidence to enable any meaningful statements to be made. The papers in this volume show how this situation is changing. Hitherto the concept of a pan‑European, and even perhaps universal, set of political ideas identified as fascism has rested on attempts to show the resemblances in the intellectual assumptions and the similarities in political attitude amongst the membership, and especially amongst the leadership, of the parties in question. But it is now becoming possible to make comparisons between the social composition of the membership of these parties. In spite of the national differences which emerge and in spite of the importance of local and regional issues in persuading electors to vote fascist, the overall picture which emerges is that there are in fact sufficient similarities in the social bases of the parties in question to add a further justification for considering as one the movements labelled as fascist.
In spite of the early connections between the intellectual ideas of fascism and those of the anarcho‑syndicalist wings of certain social revolutionary parties it proved subsequently very difficult for fascist parties to recruit support from the ranks of organised labour. One other group seems to have remained equally aloof: political parties organised with a specifically Roman Catholic outlook. The common social basis of fascist parties was that of a new political alliance between a fairly homogenous group of rural voters and a much less homogenous group of urban voters who were either middle‑class or had middle‑class attributes. The first group was made up of small landowners, sharecroppers and occasionally larger landowners. The second group was made up, in widely‑varying proportions, of shopkeepers, shop‑workers, bureaucrats and officials (if they were permitted by the law to join), professional people, students, handicraft workers and unemployed officers of the armed forces.
Greater refinement of statistical method and a greater accumulation of evidence may show this to be too simple a generalisation. But it does have the immediate advantage of providing a hypothesis which might steer research away from the rarefied atmosphere of the intellectual origins of fascism towards the more concrete facts of the history of fascist movements. The more numerous and influential a fascist movement, the more difficult it became for it to be guided solely by the early revolutionary ideology, both because this had little applicability to many of the real problems which the movements faced, (especially if they obtained power), and also because the social basis of the movements expanded in so unforeseen a way. Until the moment when, for example, electoral success in rural areas led, both in Italy and Germany, to a sudden acquisition of political power, neither of the fascist parties in those countries could be said to have designed an agricultural programme; their political outlook was almost exclusively urban.
How far does the study of what fascist parties in power actually did bear out this evidence on their social composition? To what extent did they pursue socio‑economic
policies in favour of the groups from which, the evidence suggests, they drew their main support? These questions are the more important because the most consistent and frequently‑encountered hypothesis on the political economy of fascism is still that which sees the fascist state as the defender of the major capital interests. According to this interpretation the first priority of fascist economic policy would have been a set of actions whose purpose would fall somewhere between 'saving the capitalist system' and 'furthering the purposes of monopoly capitalism'. Such economic priorities would certainly not be easy to reconcile with economic policies designed to satisfy the particular interests of the rural and urban supporters of the movements. Their support was given to fascist parties because they felt themselves threatened by the pace of economic change, by the forces of organized labour and organized capital. A vote for a fascist party was frequently an attempt to stop the apparently inexorable economic changes associated with the capitalist economy, an attempt to find a resting place in a restless sea of social change. What does fascist economic policy tell us about the political pressures on and the political nature of fascist parties? Is it now possible on the foundation of this new evidence about the support for and composition of fascist movements to construct a working hypothesis on the political economy of fascism'?
Fascism, Organized Labour and the Agricultural Sector
Given the failure of fascist movements to achieve any substantial power base among industrial workers, it is not surprising that they felt themselves freer to pursue a policy which was very unfavourable to organized labour. The political power of organized labour was systematically weakened by the absorption of separate labour unions into one all‑embracing party‑controlled organization. Once formed, an organization like the German Labour Front was certainly not free of the anti‑capitalist attitudes of the early fascist manifestoes, and as far as the material comforts of working life was concerned it continued to press successfully for changes. But the paternalistic and politically subservient attitudes of the fascist labour unions did not serve so well as collective bargaining as an instrument. for increasing the real incomes of workers in employment. The qualification is important because policies of national recovery in Germany and Italy sustained the level of employment above its level in the liberal democracies and in so doing sustained a higher level of income. Actual incomes received in Germany were probably higher than the available figures because of the illegal competition for skilled labour by German entrepreneurs after 1936. Even so in a period of successful economic reflation and of intensive rearmament the increase in real earnings of German workmen between 1933 and 1939 remains remarkably low. Real weekly wages, for an increased working week, rose at an annual average of less than three per cent, in a period when the annual average rate of growth of National Income was more than eight per cent.(1) The imperfect information on real wages in Italy suggests also that they fell between 1934 and 1939 during a period of growing National Income.
It was not only wage controls and the destruction of union bargaining power which were responsible for this but also the high level of food prices. Agricultural price supports in both countries and the comparatively high prices paid in Germany for food imports from south‑eastern Europe eroded the gain in wage rates after 1933. The available evidence fully supports the view that fascist economic policy both in Germany and Italy was as extraordinarily favourable towards the agricultural sector as it was unfavourable to industrial labour. Both in direct subsidies and in indirect financial
benefits agriculture was one of the main beneficiaries of the public purse in both countries. Direct subsidies usually were for the purpose of specific improvements. New equipment, better seed, local agricultural competitions were all subsidised in this way. More expensive was the creation of new farms. In Italy this took the form of the extension of the cultivable area, chiefly by the drainage of marsh land. The total expenditure in land reclamation there between 1921‑22 and July 1936 was almost three times that of the period between 1870 and 1921.(2) In Germany the creation of new farms had a specifically ideological basis. The new units were small peasant farms between 7.5 and 10 hectares whose tenures were virtually inalienable. The indirect financial benefits came through the protection against low international primary product prices and through tax benefits. The value of food imports into Germany in 1935‑38 was only thirty per cent that of 1925‑28 and in most years after 1932 Italian wheat imports were only 25 per cent of their level in 1925‑28.(3) Part of the income gain to the farming community was also eroded by higher prices for fodder. Nevertheless the increase in the earnings of self‑employed farmers in Germany between 1933 and 1938 was over three times the increase in weekly wage rates over the same period.(4) In Italy the annual mean percentage rate of growth of capital in the agricultural sector between 1920 and 1939 seems to have been higher than in the preceding and following periods.(5) It was not only in propaganda that the fascist regimes held up to admiration the image of a stable wholesome and pure peasant rurality; they actually sought by legislation to make this utopian vision a reality. The new inalienable farm units in Germany were created to be 'independent of the market and the general economic situation.'(6) Marriage loans made available to agricultural labourers could be eventually written off if the labourer stayed on the land. In Italy legislation in the growth years 1928 and 1929 specifically forbade migration from the countryside. Of course policies of this kind could not work. More than that, given the economic trends they were a positive handicap. But the utopian vision of a prosperous and stable rural society which had influenced rural voters to vote for a political creed evolved in an urban intellectual milieu was incorporated into the making of fascist economic policy and added its weight to the other influences suggesting a redistribution of economic rewards towards landowners.
Fascism, Big Business and the Expectations of the Urban Middle Class
So far, so good. But it is much less possible to show that similarly tangible economic rewards accrued to the urban middle‑class supporters of fascist movements. The range of psychological satisfactions they were offered, unambiguous symbols of their status, incorporation into a fixed and assured hierarchy, had their own importance.(7) So of course did the brake applied to the improvements in real incomes and social status of the groups below them. But early legislation in Germany against department stores or to protect handworkers' associations had less economic effect than similar government intervention in the agricultural sector. And the winds of economic and social change let loose by other aspects of government policy blew all the more keenly. The number of small firms in Germany in the 1930s fell faster than in the previous decade. The list of benefits accruing to the urban middle‑class supporters of fascist movements seems very small. This is the major weakness in attempts to elaborate a hypothesis of the political economy of fascism which would be in harmony with the present findings of research into the social bases of the movement.
Indeed, the most common hypothesis on the political economy of fascist movements has been that which identifies fascism as a stage in imperialism and sees fascist governments as an instrument of 'big business'.(8) The evidence that major capital interests conspired to bring fascist parties to power or that they gave their financial and moral support more to fascist parties than to other non‑socialist parties does not stand up to objective historical examination. The last year of the National Socialist government and the episode of the Republic of Salo show how separate were the ultimate economic social and political goals of fascism from those of the business world. None of this, however, contradicts a thesis such as that of Reinhard Kuhnl which suggests that the major capital interests were prepared to help fascist parties to power if they felt the alternative outcome of the political situation would be more threatening to their own interests. But here, of course, it is necessary to ask how serious the threat of a revolution from 'the left' actually was in Italy and in Germany. Neither does the historical evidence on the suspicions and disagreements over long‑term social objectives between major capital interests and fascist parties in Germany and Italy preclude temporary alliances in the common interest. The evidence published by Eichholtz, Schumann, Radandt and others does not substantiate the claim that German commercial policy and foreign policy were dictated by the interests of the German business world.(9) But it does show that some less scrupulous companies such as the Deutsche Bank, 1. G. Farben and Carl Zeiss with particular interests in the parts of Europe where the foreign policy of the government led to an increase in German political influence, were ready to take advantage of the German government's own unscrupulousness to further their own interests. I. G. Farben, for example, sought successfully to suppress the manufacture of certain organic chemical products in south‑eastern Europe and also to re‑establish the German domination over the French organic chemicals industry as it had existed before the Versailles Treaty.(10) The Mansfeld copper works and Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke were able to acquire possession of new sources of raw materials.(11) The Deutsche Bank sometimes extended its capital interests in central and south‑eastern Europe by bringing pressures from the Reich government to bear during negotiations.
In fact the control exercised by the central government in Italy and Germany over capital investment and the domination of investment by public treasury spending on costly programmes of rearmament and import substitution would have made it unlikely that major capital interests could in either country have conspired to pursue a course of action unsympathetic to government policy. But what made this completely out of the question was the party control exercised over the business world by its integration into the administrative machinery of the corporate state. Rearmament and import‑substitution brought to the forefront in both countries a restricted group of armament, steel and chemical manufactures with easy access to government contracts. The personnel of 1. G. Farben played a decisive role in staffing the Four Year Plan Office in Germany and in making official decisions about the industry which the company itself dominated.(12) Given the nature of government's economic objectives there was little place for small businesses and less for the estates of handworkers; rearmament contracts went to the largest producers. But this by no means meant that these powerful groups of business interests dominated the political machinery of the state. What in fact must have worried the business world was the loss of the capacity to make independent decisions. The decision to build the Salzgitter steel works to use high‑cost low‑ferrous content domestic iron ore was inspired and carried through by the government against the wishes of important groups in the German steel industry.
When the invasion of Ethiopia and the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations brought about a rapid deterioration in Italy's already dangerous foreign trading situation, the Italian government did not compromise with the opposition of capital interests.(13) Guarnieri's opinion that in Italy the limits of government intervention were 'suggesting a few names for the various boards of directors' is blatantly false.(14)
The committee structure of the corporate state was designed to increase the control of government over the business world. Trade and exchange controls, import licensing and control of the capital market all strengthened the central government's position.(15) Although therefore the process of Gleichschaltung in the Nazi state could still leave an organization like the Fuchgruppe Werkzeuge with virtually the same personnel as its predecessor in the liberal state, The Machine Tool Manufacturers' Association, the ultimate control of the Wirtschaftsgruppe Maschinen and, beyond that, of the responsible minister or plenipotentiary was not merely a constitutional nicety. With the creation of a Ministry of Armaments in Germany in 1940 the two ministers were able gradually to turn the manufacturers' committees of the corporate state into full‑time organs of state administration.
The relationship between fascist governments and major capital interests remained suspicious and ambivalent. There is still of course a lot to be discovered about events in this area in Italy. But there government control was ultimately as inescapable as in Germany. The assets of the firms in whose capital IRI had a controlling interest eventually were more than 17 per cent of total capital investment, and the technological importance of these firms for the economy was often particularly high. What is most striking about these relationships, however, is that both for the governments at the time and for historians subsequently a correct definition and understanding of them has seemed almost the central problem in defining the political economy of fascism. What happened to the political influence of small businesses, of handicraft organizations, of the fearful employees in the service sector of the economy upon fascist movements once those movements were in power? Attempts to legislate against department stores, higher profits and capital gains taxes, attempts to translate into specific action party manifestoes distinguishing between 'creative' capital and other less useful forms, all faded quickly into the background only to emerge once more in defeat in the policies of men like Sauckel and Farinacci.(16)
This is the fundamental objection to constructing a hypothesis of the political economy of fascism solely on the foundation that international comparisons of fascist parties do show great similarity in the social bases of membership and support. One of the major social groups joining and supporting fascist parties everywhere in Europe and particularly in Germany and Italy appears to have exercised very little influence on the economic policies of the two fascist parties that did seize power without the support of an occupying army. By contrast economic policy distorted the trend of economic development and income distribution in both countries in favour of the other main body of support for the party, the rural voters.
Are we to assume that, faced with the task of carrying out a policy of employment creation and rearmament, fascist governments abandoned what amounted to half their support and‑ drew closer to those major capital interests whose support was so essential to implement these policies? Schweitzer argues strongly that this is what happened and puts the date of this change of allegiance in Germany at 1936.(17) The continuity of National Socialist economic policy after the seizure of power, however, is more marked than its discontinuity. It is true that the more specifically fascist rural reforms, that creating the Reichserbhofe for example, and the few attempts to translate
to parts of Feder's original manifesto into political action are confined to the first two years of rule. But even in the first year of office, although investment in social overhead capital was the main force in employment‑creation, military expenditure still rose to 18 per cent of all public expenditure. When to this is added the cost of the agricultural support programmes, the implications of such policies in so discouraging an international environment are, in retrospect, not hard to see. They led to a trading deficit of 700 million Reichsmarks by autumn 1934 which resulted in a much tighter set of exchange trade controls and in the redirection of German trade through the New Plan. Within less than two years the Four Year Plan would be pouring public monies with even greater profligacy into costly import‑substitution programmes. Furthermore the trend of Italian economic policy in the early years of the regime was towards maintaining full links with the multilateral payments system. Attempts at implementing parts of the fascist manifesto came later rather than earlier and were one of the causes of the movement towards autarky and insulation against world prices.
Fascist Economic Policy, the Preparation for War and the Imperatives of Ideology
It would be a convenient but not very convincing way out of this dilemma to draw a clear distinction between the support for and economic policy of fascist movements and fascist governments. Short of making this distinction, how may we construct a more satisfactory hypothesis of the political economy of fascism? To do so it is first necessary to recognize that although small fascist sects were indeed only turned into powerful political movements in those few countries where conditions were such that they could attract wider electoral support, the economic policies of fascist governments were less determined by the nature of political support and by the pressure of economic events than were the policies of liberal parliamentary parties. They were more determined by prior ideological assumptions about the nature of economic activity. A vote for a fascist party was an important step in the process of conversion to the new sensibility and set of mental attitudes which, if the fascist revolution were ultimately to be successful, it would be necessary to instill in a majority of the Population. It was not seen as a bargaining counter but as act of faith. Because the real facts of economic life in the inter‑war period differed considerably from the fascist interpretation of them, this act of faith was even more a renunciation of economic rationality and a desperate double commitment. Firstly it was a commitment to accepting, whatever the international economic situation, the absolute priority of the political will to refashion the nation and the continent. Secondly it was a commitment to force economic facts as far as possible to fit the pattern required by this prior commitment to remaking political society.
The instrument by which political society would be remade was war. The agricultural policy of the fascist governments is as well explained by the desire for a strategic self‑sufficiency in food supply to avoid the dangers of blockade and dependence on foreign suppliers for food as by an attempt to shelter small rural landowners from the force of economic change, although the ideological importance of a stable and wholesome rurality for the fascist world of the future was certainly more than rhetorical. In this future war the urban white‑collar supporters had a less glamorous function to fulfil.
By forcibly incorporating the labour movement into the machinery of the fascist state the fascist governments wanted at least to prevent a recurrence of the 'stab‑m
the‑back' of 1918, even if the conversion of their members into loyal brothers in the new society could not be immediately hoped for.(18)
In any valid hypothesis on the political economy of fascism the central importance of war would have to be incorporated. There were obviously in fascist ideology no reasons for eschewing war as an instrument of national policy. But more than this war came to be seen as an instrument in forging the new society, as a positive and beneficial policy. In war the selfish liberal vices were suppressed and the more heroic and less egotistical aspects of fascist man brought to the forefront. 'Fascism', wrote Mussolini, 'the more it considers and observes the future and the development of humanity, quite apart from political considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace'.(19) One of the main reasons why economic growth in the inter‑war period was more associated with fascist regimes than the parliamentary democracies was because of the profligate spending of treasury funds on military purposes, in Germany after 1936 over 40 per cent a year. The growth of G.N. P. had no implicit connection with welfare. It was associated with quite different purposes, the exaltation of the nation and the ability to pursue an independent policy.
This attitude to warfare was only one of the inescapable historical and ideological inheritances of fascist movements and governments. These inheritances would have to be incorporated into any satisfactory hypothesis on the political economy of fascism and would have to receive equal weight with the established historical evidence about who paid for and who voted for fascist parties. They were just as important in framing policy as the immediate and short‑run political and economic pressures. Although economic policy might make significant temporary deviations to meet immediate and unforeseen contingencies in its longer‑term objectives, it remained not only subordinate to but also an integral part of the ideological and political ambitions of the fascist movement.
In the first place the original revolutionary (or counter‑revolutionary) ideology of fascism would have to be incorporated into any satisfactory definition of the political economy of fascism. This ideology was the possession of very small groups in all European societies. It saw the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the evolution of the 'materialist' creeds of liberalism, socialism, communism and democracy not as an aspect of human progress but as deep wounds inflicted on human society. Only in a fascist society could man again be restored to his original wholeness and a true social harmony be born out of a disputatious and greedy society. This healing process must begin with the small surviving uncorrupted elite which preserved an instinctual human awareness more truly democratic than a penciled cross on a ballot paper, an awareness interpreted and translated into action in the personality and will of the leader, himself the embodiment of the instinctual will to action.
The economic importance of these concepts in the administration of the fascist state has often been shown. They were one of the things responsible for the competing and disjointed nature of the executive organs in spite of the outwardly monolithic appearance of the centralized state. Each branch of the economic administration competed in the formulation and execution of economic policy with every other branch. No systematic process of arriving at rational economic solutions in committee was possible. Indeed economic rationality was not, given the nature of the fascist creed, a highly‑valued quality. It is the way in which one economic policy and organ of administration was encouraged by 'the leadership‑principle' to vie with another that makes us describe the fascist economic administration as 'inefficient'. But the significance
of the early ideology for economic life was much deeper. This may be seen from the history of the war years in Germany. When, after 1941, with the abandonment of the Blitzkrieg economy it became necessary to rationalize and unify the structure of the economic administration for the purpose of winning the war, this unification and rationalization never embraced the SS. The SS was seen as the new fascist society coming to birth in the debris of the old and the persistence of this idea explains why, at the peak of the war effort, the SS was allowed to use large labour resources at absurdly low levels of productivity in such enterprises as the German Earth and Stone Works and in concentration camps.(20)
In the second place this ideology, although elitist, was for an age of mass participation in political life. Its early development was in anarchist and syndicalist groups. In Spain Ledesma actually called his organization 'national syndicalism'. Although the ambitions of a 'working‑class' fascism were never fulfilled, the 'socialist' concepts in fascism were always present. Once again this can be seen most clearly in the last years in Germany and in the Republic of Salo in Italy. Liberated from the constraints of existence in a more complicated political world, both regimes reverted to denunciations of 'plutocrats' and 'international capital' and took up again some of the economic positions of the original fascist and national socialist manifestoes.
In the third place, the importance of the nation was overwhelming. The common elements in the national historical experience of Italy and Germany have often been stressed as explanations for the coming to power of fascist governments in these two countries, and in particular the late and imperfect achievement of national unification. It was this which encouraged the intellectual alliance between the deeply‑held sentiments of nationalism and the more rarefied and revolutionary ideas of fascism. This marriage was achieved in Italy by the events of World War I. In Germany, where political conditions were very different, it needed the social instability of the hyperinflation and also of the depression of 1929‑33 to cause voters to select the NSDAP out of all the other parties whose intention was to overturn the Versailles settlement. The offspring of this alliance was a nationalism with a much deeper popular appeal. Fascist economic policy was couched in such terms as to appear to offer the individual some chance of useful action and combination against the apparently overwhelming power of big business and of big labour organizations. It did indeed, in Turner's phrase, promise 'an anti‑modernist Utopia'. But in making that promise it seemed to offer to the fearful a possibility of genuine participation in formulating a new path of economic policy, of arresting the seemingly inexorable forces of social change in the capitalist economy, of feeling once again a sense of human worth and capacity beyond that of a mere economic unit. That the promise was for the most part spurious mattered neither to supporters nor to government. As a part of the new nation the individual could assert his individuality against impersonal forces face to face with which he had previously felt quite powerless.
In the fourth place, the alliance of this fascist ideology with nationalism produced a new and virulent conception of racial purity. The fascist elite was an elite of the blood and for economic life this also had a profound significance. The worst threat to the healing of society came from the polluting presence of people of an alien blood. Such ideas were obviously much more useful as vote‑winners in Germany than in Italy where the population was racially remarkably homogenous. But although their practical usefulness often determined the extent to which they were used, their fundamental importance for the political economy of fascism can not be doubted. German economic policy in Poland and the Soviet Union can only be understood by accepting the
integralness of these racial considerations in fascist ideology. Auschwitz was as much the logical outcome of fascist economic ideas as the blast furnaces of Salzgitter. When in 1944 labour was becoming a scarce economic factor in the battle for survival in Germany economic resources were increasingly allocated to furthering the planned extermination of the Jewish race.
A historically acceptable hypothesis of the political economy of fascism would first of all have to attribute to these four inescapable aspects the economic weight which, in reality, they merit. Starting from such a basis it would then be possible to assess more justly and to understand more exactly why the convincing evidence which we now have on the similarity of social groups from which fascist movements drew support was not more exactly expressed in the economic policy of fascist governments. The need to meet the economic demands of these groups was only one restricted aspect in formulating economic policy. And since economic policy itself by the nature of fascist thought was never a first consideration in determining important decisions, the ideological framework within which economic decisions were made often had even more weight than the practical questions of satisfying the economic wishes of those groups which supported the regime.
1 D. Petzina, Grundriss der deutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1918 bis 1945, in Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Deutsche Geschichte seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg, vol. 2, (Stuttgart, 1973), p. 757.
2 W G. Welk, Fascist Economic Policy, (Cambridge, Mass.), 1938, p. 192.
3 Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich; Annuario statistico Italiano.
4 Petzina, op. cit.
5 G. Fua, Formazione, distribuzione a impiego del reddito dal 1861; sintesi statistica, (Istituto nazionale per to studio della congiuntura, Rome, 1972.)
6 D. Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933‑1939, (New York, 1966), p. 157 (1967 edition).
7 Schoenbaum, op. cit.; H. Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich. Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, no. 13, (Stuttgart, 1966).
8 Among the numerous examples may be cited, D. Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939‑1945, vol. 1, 1939‑1941, (Berlin, 1969); K. Gossweiler, Grossbanken, Industriemonopole, Staat. Okonomie and Politik des staatsmonopolistischen Kapitalismus in Deutschland, 1914‑1932, (Berlin, 1971); E. Czichon, Wer verhalf Hitler zur Macht? (Cologne, 1967); D. Guerin, Sur le fascisme; fascisme et grand capital, (Paris, 1936, 1965); E. Rossi, Padroni del vapore a fascismo, (Bari, 1955).
9 D. Eichholtz, op. cit.; D. Eichholtz and W. Schumann, Anatomie des Krieges: neue Dokumente fiber die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung and Durchfuhrung des zweiten Weltkrieges, (Berlin, 1969); I3. Radandt, 'Die I. G. Farbenindustrie and Sudosteuropa 1938 bis zum Ende des zweiten Weltkrieges', in Jahrbuch fur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, no. 1, 1967; W. Schumann, 'Das Kriegsprogramm des Zeiss‑Konzerns' in Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft, 1963.
10 A. S. Milward, The New Order and the French Economy (Oxford, 1970), p. 101 ff.
11 H. Radandt, Kriegsverbrecherkonzern Mansfeld, Die Rolle des Mansfeld‑Konzernes bei der Vorbereitung and wahrend des zweiten Weltkrieges (Berlin, 1957); A. S. Milward, The Fascist Economy in Norway, (Oxford, 1972), p. 86.
12 D. Petzina, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, no. 16, (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 123.
13 R. Sarti, Fascism and the Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919‑1940, (Berkeley, 1971).
14 F. Guarneri, Battaglie economiche tra It, clue graudi guerre, (Milan, 1953), vol. 1, p. 31 7.
15 The best study is J. S. Geer. Der Mark., der gese hlossenen Nachfrage, (Berlin, 1961).
16 A. S. Milward, 'French Labour and the German Economy, 1942‑1945: An Essay in the Nature of the Fascist New Order' in Economic History Review, XXIII, no. 2, 1970. On the Republic of Salo see F. W. Deakin, The Last Days of Mussolini, (London, 1962).
17 A. Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Rcich (Bloomington, 1964).
18 T. W. Mason, Arbeiterklaase and Volkesgemeinschaft Dokumente and materialien zur deutschen Arbeitspolitik 1936‑39, (Opladen, 1975).
19 Quoted by Welk, op. cit., p. 190. z°
20 E. Georg, Die wirtschaftlichen Untcrtichinungen der SS, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljalirshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, no. 7, (Stuttgart, 1963); J. Billig, Les camps de, concentration duns l'econoinie du Reich hitlerien (Paris, 1973).